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Knox: Telos and Techne

TELOS AND TECHNE
Paul Knox*
ABSTRACT
It seems reasonable to assert that the planning profession should be
understood as serving society by providing vision, anticipation, innovation, and
inspiration in the cause of human flourishing; that its telos is to create functional,
efficient, and sustainable physical environments and to contribute to the material
realization of societal aspirations of what it means to live well. But it is the techne—
the application of the field’s context-dependent armory of tactics, practices,
concepts, approaches, and methods—that counts most in determining success in the
cause of human flourishing. This article comments on the tensions between telos
and techne in planning.
CONTEXT
In short, planning offers the promise of creating better cities, whether at the
scale of streets, neighborhoods, or city-regions. The problem for planners is that
theirs will always be a dependent field, entwined in complex and temporary
assemblages of expertise and interests that constrain their professional autonomy.
In addition to the calculative practices of developers, financiers, and builders,
planners’ work depends, project by project, plan by plan, on multiple federal, state,
and local agencies and on interactions among auxiliary actors in transportation and
utility companies, engineering and technical subcontractors, surveyors, market
analysts, appraisers, property managers, chambers of commerce, lawyers, and title
insurance and trust companies. Born a hybrid creature at the turn of the twentieth
century, dedicated on the one hand to progressive reform but charged on the other
with economic development and the management of urban land, the field has coevolved not only with the property development and construction industries, with
building and transportation technologies, and with state regulatory frameworks but
also with social movements, environmental movements, conservation movements
and its big sister, architecture.1 All this, meanwhile, has been subject to the “pathshaping” moments of capitalism’s regular and recurrent crises; and embedded in
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the evolutionary twists and turns of an overall political economy that routinely
generates conflict and contradiction and demands compromise.
Within these broader parameters, the accumulation of ideas and dispositions
that began with Olmsted2—and grew with Burnham, Howard, Perry, Mumford,
Moses, Stein, Nolen, and others—has left the field with a distinctive ethos: a set of
beliefs, values, and aspirations that underpin both praxis and discourse. The
cumulative outcome is a challenging amalgam of concern with health, safety, order,
social harmony, civic beauty, social equity, environmental quality, and utility,
functionalism, and efficiency in the organization of space.
So much, perhaps, for the telos and ethos of planning; it is the techne—the
application of the field’s context-dependent armory of tactics, practices, concepts,
approaches, and methods—that counts most in determining success in the cause of
human flourishing. The foundational concepts derived from the seers (zoning,
social mix, neighborhood units, superblocks, new towns, garden suburbs, hub-andspoke transportation systems, regulatory codes, and so on) were crucial here. They
have been sustained within internal discursive forums, consecrated in textbooks,
and baked into accredited university curricula. By the early 1960s they amounted,
in Bourdieu’s terminology, to a “force field” that would shape the techne of
planning and determine the effectiveness of the profession. As we know now, this
foundational force field soon became something of a Bermuda Triangle in which
key dimensions of the telos—human flourishing, social, economic, and
environmental justice, and the public interest—were often lost. Jane Jacobs could
see it coming.3 It was a miscarriage precipitated by a mixture of hubris, bureaucratic
aggression, and disciplinary shortcomings.
Newly granted the power and resources to reconceptualize the city in
innovative modern form in the two decades following World War II, the profession
developed an evangelical spirit: Cities should be better places; they could be. It was
a golden age for planning. Time magazine featured Edmund Bacon, executive
director of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission, on its November 6, 1964,
cover. Encouraged by public confidence in professional expertise, bolstered by an
overly optimistic view of social and economic trends, heavily conditioned by hero
worship of the pre-war seers, and super confident in their own abilities, planners
unleashed their good intentions in ever-grander schemes. The spirit of the time was
personified by Robert Moses and his team in New York, wrestling urbanization into
a manifestation of the American Dream in which the freedom to build for money
2

Fishman, R. ‘The American Planning Tradition: An Introduction and Interpretation.’ In Fishman,
R., ed., The American Planning Tradition: Culture and Policy. Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2000.
3

Jacobs, J., The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random House, 1961.
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and the freedom to drive everywhere, anytime, were the principal assumptions. The
mantle of “bureaucratic evangelism” adopted by Moses and many other less
powerful and less charismatic planners seemed to fit well with the telos of the
profession; and had the additional benefit of insulating practitioners from the
conflicts and critiques that inevitably arose from the pursuit of their work. 4 They
were all, meanwhile, beneficiaries of an intellectual legacy that resonated with
environmental determinism and was tinged with paternalism, giving them a
misplaced visionary confidence. “Tasked with articulating progressive solutions to
urban development, the design fields acquired new significance for which they
were not entirely prepared. In seizing the chance to create the good city, architects
and planners drew on ideas, preconceptions, and habits of mind accumulated from
premodern times onward, buoyed by the revolutionary fervor of the interwar
period.”5
Compounding the limitations of this intellectual legacy were the
shortcomings of the new, hastily assembled academic discipline. By the 1960s, the
field was firmly ensconced in academia, with formally accredited curricula. But the
field had little to offer by way of a distinctive body of knowledge underpinned by
explanatory theory. It made for an anarchic intellectual milieu. In its search for
legitimacy and a distinctive academic identity and practical purpose, planning
moved away from its shared roots with architecture toward positivist systems-based
and rational decision-making approaches, and then to a pragmatic politicalbureaucratic approach, all within the space of a couple of decades. As a result, the
field lost much of its visionary capacity, its claims on the guardianship of an
overarching public interest and, ultimately, its professional authority. At the
forefront of what Peter Hall called planners’ “borrowed intellectual baggage” were
“scatterings of social science” from the Chicago School of sociology, geographers’
concepts of functional regions and central places, economists’ forecasting models,
cost-benefit analysis, and theories of bid-rent, and the locational economics of the
new field of regional science, along with engineers’ models of traffic flow and the
systems thinking of another new field, cybernetics. These were employed simply
as “snippets of useful knowledge,” not as any consistent or coherent framework of
understanding.6 Rather, they were deployed as justification for a process of
incremental planning: the “comprehensive-rational” approach based on sequential
stages of goal formulation, problem formulation, generation and evaluation of
options, and policy selection.
4

Davies, J. G., The Evangelistic Bureaucrat. London: Tavistock, 1972.

5

Knox, 2020, 166.

6

Hall, P., Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the
Twentieth Century. London: Wiley, 2014, 388.
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As the shortcomings of such an approach became apparent, other
borrowings led to different approaches. The field’s own theories (what have
become known as “planning theories”) were inward-looking, second-order theories
that took as their subject the process of planning: philosophical accounts of how,
ideally, planners should plan; or typologies of how planners actually did plan. 7 The
idea with most traction in academia was “advocacy planning,” based on a model
adapted from the legal profession. But mainstream planning ideology, having
generated various “disparate, incommensurable, and idiosyncratic ‘conceptions’ of
urban planning,” became “deeply confused as to the meaning, properties, and tasks
of theoretical enquiry.”8 One consequence of this intellectual involution, as Robert
Beauregard noted, was to move planning education away from a studio model to
the pedagogical model of the social sciences: the lecture and seminar, with students
learning through texts rather than direct problem-solving.
Meanwhile, beyond academia:
... planning practice diversified into a multitude of specialties:
environmental, manpower, social planning, health planning,
transportation, energy planning, and regional planning along with
the traditional land-use and housing … A variety of social
planners challenged the increasingly specialized physical
planners. As a result, planning practice underwent centrifugal
disintegration. The common object of interest—the city—that
had initially attracted “progressive” reformers was lost.9
Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky observed that planning had extended so
thinly over so wide an area that it was almost meaningless: “if planning is
everything, maybe it’s nothing.”10 In the absence of a clear disciplinary identity,
the combination of evangelism, determinism, and paternalism produced a
professional make-up that proved tragically mismatched to the telos. Even in their
finest hour, planners were forced to watch themselves fail. Blinkered technical
rationality, hubris, and “moral inversion” led them to get bogged down in
“bureaucratic offensives” of urban renewal and highway construction to the point
7

Hightower, H., ‘Planning Theory in Contemporary Professional Education,’ Journal of the
American Institute of Planners, 35, 1969, 326–30; Faludi, A., Planning Theory. Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1973; Allmendinger, P., Planning Theory, 3rd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2017.
8

Scott, A. J., and Roweis, S. T., ‘Urban Planning in Theory and Practice: A Reappraisal,’
Environment and Planning A, 9, 1977, 1097.
9

Beauregard R., ‘Between Modernity and Postmodernity: The Ambiguous Position of US
Planning,’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 7, 1989, 383.
10
Wildavsky, A., ‘If Planning Is Everything, Maybe It’s Nothing,’ Policy Sciences, 4, 1973, 127–
53.
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where the communities whose lives they had hoped to improve were angry and
afraid.11 Before they knew it, their techne had led them to become social
gatekeepers.
A new conventional wisdom emerged. Jane Jacobs had, indeed, called it.
She had argued that cities were serving as “sacrificial victims” to the misguided
ideas of the pre-war seers. The pursuit of their ideas, she asserted, had taken away
the life and vitality of cities, tearing out their sclerotic hearts only to replace them
with a “great blight of Dullness” in the form of high-rise apartment blocks; and
meanwhile freezing the existing social order in physical form. Adherence to the
dogma of land-use segregation, she pointed out, resulted in the loss of vitality and
serendipity in urban life. Left to planners, she argued, city landscapes “will be
spacious, parklike, and uncrowded. They will feature long green vistas. They will
be stable and symmetrical and orderly. They will be clean, impressive, and
monumental. They will have all the attributes of a well-kept, dignified cemetery.” 12
By the mid-1970s, planning was no longer understood by the public as a
real force for progressive socioeconomic change. Critics in the popular press tended
increasingly to portray planners as authoritarian and unaccountable. Practitioners
and academics had their own doubts. Alison Ravetz concluded that planning had
been transformed from an “enabling” to a “disabling” profession as a result of its
professional ethos and its evangelical mantle that enabled practitioners to turn a
deaf ear to criticism.13 Leonie Sandercock characterized planning as having pursued
“anti-democratic, race and gender-blind, and culturally homogenizing practices.” 14
The tide of opinion had turned; it was the end of an era. It coincided with the
flatlining of growth in real incomes and it contributed to the emergence of the
neoliberal political economy.
But if planners were not entirely prepared for the responsibilities they
acquired in the postwar period, they were certainly not prepared for the sudden
change of circumstances brought about by neoliberalism. The telos of the
profession was dissonant with free enterprise, everyone-for-themselves
neoliberalism, its techne redundant. Landowners and developers challenged the
fundamental power of city governments to protect public health, safety, and welfare
11

Benton, M., '”Saving” the City: Harland Bartholomew and Administrative Evil in St. Louis,’
Public Integrity, 20. 2, 2018, 194-206.
12

Jacobs, J., ‘Downtown Is for People.’ In Whyte, W. Jr., ed., The Exploding Metropolis. Garden
City, NY: Doubleday,1958, 157.
13

Ravetz, A., Remaking Cities. London: Croom Helm, 1980.

14

Sandercock, L., Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities. Chichester: John
Wiley, 1988, 4.
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through planning regulations. Libertarians and property-rights activists advanced
the notion that zoning and regulations on real estate depress potential property
values, lobbying for laws that would treat most zoning and land-use regulations as
takings. Others voted with their feet, moving to privatized spaces that are exempt
from municipal land-use planning regulations: the “secession of the successful.”
The wealthy in effect withdrew their dollars from the support of public spaces and
institutions shared by all, dedicating the savings to their own private services. 15
Encouraged by a banking industry that was increasingly lenient toward borrowers,
it did not take long for suburban landscapes to reflect the result: a proliferation of
the suburban bling of “Vulgaria” and “Privatopia.”16 David Harvey, described the
packaged landscapes of privately-planned communities as paradigmatic
“degenerate utopias:” degenerate, in Harvey’s view, because the oppositional force
implicit in the progressive and utopian ideals central to the telos of planning had
been perverted, in the course of translation into private enclaves, into an
intensification of commodity culture.17
City governments meanwhile became more entrepreneurial in competing
for investment. Public-private partnerships became the standard vehicle for
achieving urban change, replacing the strategic role of city planning departments
with piecemeal deal-making.18 It was no coincidence that private capital had
become available for public-private partnerships just as cities were facing
retrenchment and fiscal stress: both were the product of the phase of
overaccumulation following the economic system-shock precipitated by the OPEC
price hike and the recession of the mid-1970s. Changing circumstances in
international, national, and real estate markets brought the private sector to the
public sector as much as ideological and fiscal shifts brought the public sector to
the private sector.
Just as city governments needed to become more competitive, their planners
were placed at a further disadvantage by the globalization of finance and the
emergence of a “global corporate urban intelligence complex”—international
property development companies, global consulting firms such as AECOM,
Bechtel, Mercer, and McKinsey; and global technology and engineering firms like
15

Reich, R., ‘Secession of the Successful,’ New York Times Magazine, Jan. 20, 1991, 17.

16

McKenzie, E., Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private
Government. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994; Knox, P. L., Metroburbia USA. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008; Blakely E., and Snyder, M. G., Fortress America:
Gated Communities in the United States. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999.
17

Harvey, D., Spaces of Hope. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

18

Sager, T., ‘Neo-Liberal Urban Planning Policies: A Literature Survey 1990–2010,’ Progress in
Planning, 76, 2011, 147–99.
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Arup and Siemens—and their armies of private-sector consultant planners.
Academic planning theory and local initiative were both sidelined by the “traveling
ideas” circulated among the corporate urban intelligence complex in trade shows
such as the Marché international des professionnels de l’immobilier (MIPIM), a
property fair held annually in Cannes. In the echo chamber of international
conferences and trade shows, the most seductive of all traveling ideas was propertyled brownfield redevelopment, resulting in the serial reproduction of predictable
ensembles of office buildings, retail space, condominium towers, cultural
amenities, renovated spaces, landscaping, and street furniture.
Property-led development was supercharged by the surplus capital of
oligarchs and oil sheikhs and “flight capital” from war zones and failed states.
When, after the scandalous financial crisis of 2008, Swiss banks were less willing
to fulfil their traditional role of no-questions-asked banking, the property markets
of Manhattan, Chicago, Los Angeles, Vancouver, and other world cities filled the
gap—somewhere for the global super-rich to park their money. Property in the
“alpha districts” of these cities became a form of reserve currency for the “one
percent” as rich foreigners paid large sums for trophy properties. In this context,
city planners found themselves functioning as a special category of wealth
managers, directing the redevelopment of under-performing property markets, and
incentivizing private real estate development while maintaining the conditions for
capital accumulation: ensuring predictable conditions for real estate development
and orchestrating the efficiency of urban settings as sites of production and
consumption. Consequently, planning has sacrificed its roles as visionary and
idealist and abandoned its responsibility “to be a source of inspiration and to
produce ideas about what might be and what ought to be.” 19
THE STRUGGLE FOR RELEVANCE
Looking back at decades of urban development that has been—largely—
environmentally insensitive, aesthetically underwhelming, dysfunctional, and
socially regressive, we should bear in mind that it has not all been planners’ fault.
Planning has always been a dependent field, and its inability to articulate a
compelling role in the political economy of neoliberalism has meant that it has
steadily became more so. Nor did it mean that planners as individuals have
abandoned their telos (even if they have collectively lost sight of it). Many (most?)
individual practitioners, educators, and students still sincerely assert that they are
deeply committed to social, economic, and environmental justice. What is needed

19

Isserman, A., ‘Dare to Plan: An Essay on the Role of the Future in Planning Practice and
Education,’ Town Planning Review, 85, 1, 2014, 9–18.
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is a recovery of the collective telos and a new techne: new approaches geared to
contemporary circumstances.
Unfortunately, one of the first and most widely embraced new approaches
was regressive, in every sense of the word. New Urbanism was a copyrighted
version of degenerate utopias where design codes became behavior codes. There
was almost nothing new about New Urbanism apart from its sophistication in
organization, branding, and marketing. It was substantively a derivative hybrid of
ideas and impulses that drew on the intellectuals’ utopias of the nineteenth century
and the techne of twentieth-century seers. 20 But it seemed, for a while, to provide
planners with an opportunity to recover from their marginalized situation, it sat
comfortably with the sensibilities of neoliberalism, and was enthusiastically
received by credulous journalists (as well as savvy developers).
The failings of New Urbanism “estranged it from all but the most
conservative design schools.”21 Into the vacuum came other elements of a potential
new techne. Conservation and heritage protection shifted from being a marginal
activity in urban planning to being a central element of the field, and from being
conceived as a restraint on development to a catalyst for it. It was certainly an area
where planners could reassert some relevance, pointing to the beneficent effects in
terms of tourism, neighborhood revitalization, and the restoration of depreciated
downtown real estate values (but prudently not drawing attention to the
gentrification effects).22
Other elements have been added to the contemporary armory of tactics,
practices, concepts, and approaches of the field, each grasped by academics and
practitioners as a potential escape from the professional suffocations of a neoliberal
political economy. Landscape Urbanism, Sustainability, Smart Growth, Tactical
Urbanism, Smart Cities, and Resilience, for example. But each has its own
shortcomings and limitations. Landscape urbanism revives Patrick Geddes’s and
Ian McHarg’s laudable traditions of “designing with nature” and merges them with
systems-thinking from ecology and new digital visualization and rendering
techniques in a particular version of sustainable development. But while there is
general agreement about the symptoms of unsustainable development (structural
economic decline, environmental degradation, outmigration, segregation,
20

Knox, 2008.

21

La Peña, D., ‘New Landscape Urbanisms: Promising New Paths for Urban Design,’ Journal of
Urban Design, 20, 3, 2015, 315.
22

Ryberg-Webster, S., and Kinahan, K. L. ‘Historic Preservation and Urban Revitalization in the
Twenty-first Century,’ Journal of Planning Literature, 29, 2, 2014; Listokin, D., Listokin, B., and
Lahr, M., ‘The Contributions of Historic Preservation to Housing and Economic Development,’
Housing Policy Debate, 9, 3, 1998, 431–78.
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exclusion, antisocial behavior, and loss of distinctiveness and sense of place),
specifying just what is—or may be—sustainable is still problematic, and it is not
easy to find compelling, comprehensive examples of sustainable or landscape
urbanism.
Smart growth is a fuzzy and elastic concept that boils down to guiding
growth to more efficient locations at higher densities. In that sense it can be seen
as a stealthy euphemism for old-fashioned land-use planning and growth
management of the sort that cannot be entertained in the lexicon of a neoliberal
political economy. Tactical urbanism involves unsanctioned activist or communityled guerilla tactics in the spirit of the right-to-the-city movement, aimed at
reclaiming at least some of the field’s ideological affinity for social justice. It
centers on small-scale interventions: pop-up parks, temporary community gardens,
art installations, and so on. But the aesthetic and sense of cool hipsterism
propagated by tactical urbanism plays directly into the neoliberal “creative city”
discourse. In practical terms it amounts to nothing more than an invitation to
gentrification.
The two themes that have elicited the most widespread enthusiasm recently
are smart cities and resilience. The narrative around smart cities emphasizes the
potential efficiency, flexibility, and sustainability of “wired” urban environments,
together with the prospect of making such cities more competitive in the global
market. This narrative mobilizes and recycles two long-standing tropes in planning
circles: the city conceived as a system of systems, and a utopian discourse framed
around urban pathologies and their cure. 23 In many ways, “smart” has superseded
“sustainable” as the principal prism through which the future of cities is now
viewed, more immediately useful in attracting investment and key workers. That is
certainly the conclusion of the global corporate urban intelligence complex, with
technology, engineering, and consulting firms like Amazon, Arup, Cisco,
Facebook, General Electric, Hitachi, Huawei, IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, Philips,
SAP, Siemens, and Alphabet’s subsidiaries Google and Sidewalk Labs investing
significantly in the prospect. But, as with sustainable urbanism, it is not easy to find
full-fledged examples of smart cities. Most smart city developments, notably, are
only fragments or layers within cities—disconnected and sealed-off technological
enclaves of urban fabric that Federico Cugurullo has characterized as Frankenstein
Urbanism: “unsuccessful experiments generated by the forced union of different,

23

Söderström, O., Paasche, T., and Klauser, F., ‘Smart Cities as Corporate Storytelling,’ City, 18,
3, 2014, 307–20.

Published by Reading Room,

196

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 5 [], Iss. 1, Art. 18

incongruous parts.”24 But a fully-fledged smart city would need a free flow of data
across sectors and systems that are normally separate, something that could only be
realized with a new kind of city government—a public-private partnership with one
or more of the global corporate urban intelligence giants providing mass monitoring
and data collection. It therefore raises the deeply sinister prospect of the
manipulation of a compliant and accommodating citizenry. It also plays into what
Shoshana Zuboff dubbed “surveillance capitalism,”25 the commodification and
exploitation of personal information. Meanwhile, smart technologies create new
vulnerabilities and threats, including making city infrastructure and services
insecure, brittle, and open to extended forms of criminal activity: an issue that
planners are ill-equipped to deal with.26
The narrative around resilience has been framed by an increased awareness
of this kind of risk and vulnerability. The concept has been foregrounded by the
2008–2009 global financial meltdown, by extreme weather events, flooding, and
peri-urban wildfires associated with global warming; and, most recently, by the
coronavirus pandemic and consequent economic recession. Like its ideological
twin, sustainability, resilience is a “bridging concept” that can be used and
interpreted in very different ways. At the simplest level, increased resilience implies
the ability to endure greater stresses or to bounce back faster after a disturbance:
what has become known as “engineering” or “equilibrium” resilience. A more
satisfactory understanding of resilience includes the inherent conditions that allow
a system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event adaptive
processes that help the system to reorganize, change, and learn in response to the
event.27
The attractiveness of the concept has drawn the attention of many of the
same actors behind the idea of smart cities: property development companies,
global consulting firms such as AECOM, Bechtel and McKinsey, ICT companies
like Cisco and IBM, and global technology and engineering firms like Arup and
24

Cugurullo, F., ‘Exposing Smart Cities and Eco-Cities: Frankenstein Urbanism and the
Sustainability Challenges of the Experimental City,’ Environment and Planning A: Economy and
Space, 50, 1, 2018, 75.
25

Zuboff, S., The Age of Surveillance Capital: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier
of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2019.
26

Kitchin, R., and Dodge, M., ‘The (In)Security of Smart Cities: Vulnerabilities, Risks,
Mitigation, and Prevention,’ Journal of Urban Technology, 26, 2, 2019, 47–65; Elmaghraby, A.
S., and Losavio, M., ‘Cyber Security Challenges in Smart Cities: Safety, Security and Privacy,’
Journal of Advanced Research, 5, 2014, 491–97.
27

Cutter, S., et al., Community and Regional Resilience: Perspectives from Hazards, Disasters,
and Emergency Management. Oak Ridge, TN: Community and Regional Resilience Initiative,
2008.
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Siemens. Together with supranational organizations such as UN Habitat, the World
Bank, and the nonprofit Rockefeller Foundation, they constitute a “resilience
machine.”28 This commodification of resilience and its deployment as part of
neoliberal “shock doctrine” (taking advantage of disasters to usher in policies such
as privatization and surveillance)29 means that resilience sits comfortably in the
discourses and practices of neoliberalism. Its implicit appeal is to support the status
quo and promote business as usual. That is, the need to manage and adapt to shocks
and stresses, rather than seeking to redress or rework the political and economic
forces behind them.30 Meanwhile, as a bridging concept it has perhaps inevitably
become overexposed, its inherited meanings from disparate disciplines—
engineering, psychology, community studies, economics, ecology, management,
and so on—making for ambiguity and confusion instead of mutual understanding.
All this begs the question of how planning might recapture its mojo and
offer again the genuine prospect of building a changing world responsibly, fulfilling
its promise of creating better cities and supporting human flourishing. We should
bear in mind that the field only acquired the capacity to be a significant force with
the welfare capitalism of the New Deal, only to lose it between 1968 and 1973 when
the critique articulated by Jane Jacobs was compounded by economic crisis and the
emergence of a neoliberal political economy. In this context, Milton Friedman’s
observation seems pertinent: “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real
change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that
are lying around.”31
The societal perception of the scale of crisis seems critical here. It requires
what the ancient Greeks called aporia: some combination of economic,
technological, social, political, or cultural change that leads large (or key) sections
of society to question accepted ideals and practices. (As, for example, the European
political crises of 1848 that brought the beginnings of deep social and political
reform; the upheavals and disjunctions that followed the First World War and
fostered the introduction of welfare states; the Great Depression that produced
Keynesianism; and the 1973 OPEC-induced inflationary crisis that unleashed

28

Bohland, J., Davoudi, S., and Lawrence, J., eds., The Resilience Machine. New York;
Routledge, 2109.
29

Klein, N., The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Macmillan, 2007.

30

Joseph, J., ‘Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: Governmentality Approach,’ Resilience, 1,
1, 2013, 38–52; Tierney, K., ‘Resilience and the Neoliberal Project: Discourses, Critiques,
Practices—And Katrina,’ American Behavioral Scientist, 5, 10, 2015, 1327–42.
31

Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
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corporate globalization and neoliberalism.) There is a plausible case that
accelerating climate change amounts to such a crisis.
The question then becomes, following Friedman: what ideas are lying
around? We don’t need another set of borrowed intellectual baggage, or a solipsistic
manifesto of the kind favored by architects. 32 To fulfill the telos of the profession,
it surely has to be a compelling idea rooted in progressive reform and characterized
by strategic purpose. A Green New Deal, perhaps? A systems-driven approach with
responsibility for federal, regional, and local planning agencies to strategically
orchestrate investment in clean energy research, a distributed smart grid and highspeed rail network, the retrofitting of vulnerable cities with green infrastructure,
and the managed retreat from coastal and desert areas. 33 This, of course,
presupposes a crisis-induced transformation of the overall political economy in
which planning agencies are embedded: a realignment of politics, a reinvigoration
of public service, and a renewed commitment to environmental and social justice.
Planning agencies, in turn, would need practitioners to free themselves of the “force
field” of conventional wisdoms that are still tinged with the mucky end of the
determinist stick and “good-design-can-save-us” wishful thinking that is
propagated in much of the professional and academic literature and sustained by
the institutional inertia of the APA, AICP, ACSP, and PAB. 34

32

Knox, 2020.

33

Fleming, W., ‘Design and the Green New Deal,’ Places, April 2019.

34

Respectively: the American Planning Association (APA) which is comprised of more than
40,000 members; the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP) which is a 17,000-some
member subset of the APA reflecting elevated levels of education, experience, and passing grade
on a qualifying examination; the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP) which is
comprised of accredited planning programs; and the Planning Accreditation Board (PAB) which is
operated jointed by the APA and ACSP that is charged with credentialing planning programs.
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